The importance of equally accessible genomic surveillance in the age of pandemics.

Genomic epidemiology is now a core component in investigating the spread of a disease during an outbreak and for future preparedness to tackle emerging zoonoses. During the last decades, several viral diseases arose and emphasized the importance of molecular epidemiology in tracking the dispersal route, supporting proper mitigation measures, and appropriate vaccine development. In this perspective article, we summarized what has been done so far in the genomic epidemiology field and what should be considered in the future. We traced back the methods and protocols employed over time for zoonotic disease response. Either to small outbreaks such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak identified first in 2002 in Guangdong, China, or to a global pandemic like the one that we are experiencing now since 2019 when the severe acute respiratory syndrome 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus emerged in Wuhan, China, following several pneumonia cases, and subsequently spread worldwide. We explored both the benefits and shortages encountered when relying on genomic epidemiology, and we clearly present the disadvantages of inequity in accessing these tools around the world, especially in countries with less developed economies. For effectively addressing future pandemics, it is crucial to work for better sequencing equity around the globe.

Continuous surveillance and viral discovery in animals and humans are a core component of a one-health approach to address recent viral reverse zoonoses.

Contemporary human and animal viruses have a broad or narrow host range-those with a broad host range are potentially transmitted from animals to humans (ie, zoonosis) or humans to animals (ie, reverse zoonosis). This Currents in One Health article reviews the recent reverse zoonoses involving Coronaviridae, Poxviridae, arboviruses, and, for nonhuman primate species, the human respiratory viruses. The prevention and control of reverse zoonoses are also reviewed. Coronaviruses continue to emerge as new zoonotic agents, including a canine coronavirus, CCoV-HuPn-2018, circulating in people at low levels, and a pangolin coronavirus, MjHKU4r-CoV-1, circulating in Malayan pangolins. Moreover, the risk for SARS-CoV-2 variants to mutate in animal reservoirs and reinfect humans is ongoing. In the case of mpox, the risk of reverse zoonosis is low and there are vaccines for use in humans at risk. The situation with arboviruses is as varied as the number of human arboviruses, and only yellow fever virus and dengue virus have licensed vaccines in the Americas. As for reverse zoonoses in endangered species, solutions require changing human behavior and policies at all levels impacting wildlife. Overall, continuous surveillance and viral discovery in humans and animals remain core components of a one-health approach to reduce and, where possible, eliminate zoonotic and reverse zoonotic diseases. Viral zoonosis and viral reverse zoonosis focusing on recent influenza A virus disease events in humans and other species are the subjects of the companion Currents in One Health by Kibenge, AJVR, June 2023.

Advancing One human-animal-environment Health for global health security: what does the evidence say?

In this Series paper, we review the contributions of One Health approaches (ie, at the human-animal-environment interface) to improve global health security across a range of health hazards and we summarise contemporary evidence of incremental benefits of a One Health approach. We assessed how One Health approaches were reported to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), and WHO, within the monitoring and assessment frameworks, including WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and WOAH Performance of Veterinary Services. We reviewed One Health theoretical foundations, methods, and case studies. Examples from joint health services and infrastructure, surveillance-response systems, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance, food safety and security, environmental hazards, water and sanitation, and zoonoses control clearly show incremental benefits of One Health approaches. One Health approaches appear to be most effective and sustainable in the prevention, preparedness, and early detection and investigation of evolving risks and hazards; the evidence base for their application is strongest in the control of endemic and neglected tropical diseases. For benefits to be maximised and extended, improved One Health operationalisation is needed by strengthening multisectoral coordination mechanisms at national, regional, and global levels.

Blind spots in biodefense.

In October, the Biden administration released its National Biodefense Strategy (NBS-22), the first update since the COVID-19 pandemic began. Although the document notes that one of the lessons of the pandemic is that threats originating anywhere are threats everywhere, it frames threats as largely external to the United States. NBS-22 focuses primarily on bioterrorism and laboratory accidents, neglecting threats posed by routine practices of animal use and production inside the United States. NBS-22 references zoonotic disease but assures readers that no new legal authorities or institutional innovations are needed. Although the US is not alone in failing to confront these risks, its failure to comprehensively address them echoes across the globe.

One Health activities to reinforce intersectoral coordination at local levels in India.

India's dense human and animal populations, agricultural economy, changing environment, and social dynamics support conditions for emergence/re-emergence of zoonotic diseases that necessitate a One Health (OH) approach for control. In addition to OH national level frameworks, effective OH driven strategies that promote local intersectoral coordination and collaboration are needed to truly address zoonotic diseases in India. We conducted a literature review to assess the landscape of OH activities at local levels in India that featured intersectoral coordination and collaboration and supplemented it with our own experience conducting OH related activities with local partners. We identified key themes and examples in local OH activities. Our landscape assessment demonstrated that intersectoral collaboration primarily occurs through specific research activities and during outbreaks, however, there is limited formal coordination among veterinary, medical, and environmental professionals on the day-to-day prevention and detection of zoonotic diseases at district/sub-district levels in India. Examples of local OH driven intersectoral coordination include the essential role of veterinarians in COVID-19 diagnostics, testing of human samples in veterinary labs for Brucella and leptospirosis in Punjab and Tamil Nadu, respectively, and implementation of OH education targeted to school children and farmers in rural communities. There is an opportunity to strengthen local intersectoral coordination between animal, human and environmental health sectors by building on these activities and formalizing the existing collaborative networks. As India moves forward with broad OH initiatives, OH networks and experience at the local level from previous or ongoing activities can support implementation from the ground up.

Influx of Backyard Farming with Limited Biosecurity Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic Carries an Increased Risk of Zoonotic Spillover in Cambodia.

Backyard farming with limited biosecurity creates a massive potential for zoonotic spillover. Cambodia, a developing nation in Southeast Asia, is a hub for emerging and endemic infectious diseases. Due to pandemic-induced job losses in the tourism sector, rumors suggest that many former Cambodian tour guides have turned to backyard farming as a source of income and food security. A cross-sectional study including 331 tour guides and 69 poultry farmers in Cambodia before and during the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic was conducted. Participants were administered a survey to assess food security, income, and general farming practices. Survey data were collected to evaluate the risk perceptions for avian influenza virus (AIV), antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and general biosecurity management implemented on these poultry farms. Overall, food security decreased for 80.1% of the tour guides during the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately 21% of the tour guides interviewed used backyard poultry farming to supplement losses of income and food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a significantly higher risk than for traditional poultry farmers. Agricultural intensification in Cambodia due to the COVID-19 pandemic has caused an influx of makeshift farms with limited biosecurity. Inadequate biosecurity measures in animal farms can facilitate spillover and contribute to future pandemics. Improved biosecurity and robust viral surveillance systems are critical for reducing the risk of spillover from backyard farms. IMPORTANCE While this study highlights COVID-19-associated changes in poultry production at a small scale in Cambodia, poultry production is expected to expand due to an increase in the global demand for poultry protein during the pandemic, changes in urbanization, and the reduction of the global pork supply caused by African swine fever (ASF). The global demand and surge in poultry products, combined with inadequate biosecurity methods, can lead to an increased risk of domestic animal and human spillovers of zoonotic pathogens such as avian influenza. Countries in regions of endemicity are often plagued by complex emergency situations (i.e., food insecurity and economic fallouts) that hinder efforts to effectively address the emergence (or reemergence) of zoonotic diseases. Thus, novel surveillance strategies for endemic and emerging infectious diseases require robust surveillance systems and biosecurity training programs to prevent future global pandemics.

The outbreak of monkeypox: A clinical overview.

The development of new zoonotic diseases such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and monkeypox that can cause epidemics and high mortality rates have significantly threatened global health security. However, the increasing number of people with no immunity to poxvirus because of the end of the smallpox vaccination programme has created a vulnerable population for the monkeypox outbreak. On 23 July 2022, it was announced that the World Health Organization's director-general has determined that the multicountry outbreak of monkeypox constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. The monkeypox virus is an orthopoxvirus that causes a disease with symptoms similar to smallpox but less severe. Many unanswered questions remain regarding monkeypox's pathogenesis, transmission and host reservoir. There is currently no evidence that transmission by individuals can sustain zoonotic infections during human-to-human transmissions; the continued emergence of these pathogens highlights the interconnectedness of animals and humans. The increasing number of monkeypox cases outside the endemic region has highlighted the need for effective global capacity building to prevent the spread of the disease and its impact on global health security. The priority now is to stop the spread of the disease and protect frontline healthcare workers and the most vulnerable individuals. This article aims to comprehensively analyse the various aspects of the transmission and epidemiology of monkeypox. It also explores possible diagnostic techniques, therapeutics and prevention strategies. A key recommendation is that primary care and public health professionals are expected to increase their efforts to be vigilant and contain any potential outbreaks.

Adapting Longstanding Public Health Collaborations between Government of Kenya and CDC Kenya in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020-2021.

Kenya's Ministry of Health (MOH) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Kenya (CDC Kenya) have maintained a 40-year partnership during which measures were implemented to prevent, detect, and respond to disease threats. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the MOH and CDC Kenya rapidly responded to mitigate disease impact on Kenya's 52 million residents. We describe activities undertaken jointly by the MOH and CDC Kenya that lessened the effects of COVID-19 during 5 epidemic waves from March through December 2021. Activities included establishing national and county-level emergency operations centers and implementing workforce development and deployment, infection prevention and control training, laboratory diagnostic advancement, enhanced surveillance, and information management. The COVID-19 pandemic provided fresh impetus for the government of Kenya to establish a national public health institute, launched in January 2022, to consolidate its public health activities and counter COVID-19 and future infectious, vaccine-preventable, and emerging zoonotic diseases.

Social insights on the implementation of One Health in zoonosis prevention and control: a scoping review.

BACKGROUND: The One Health (OH) concept has been promoted widely around the globe. OH framework is expected to be applied as an integrated approach to support addressing zoonotic diseases as a significant global health issue and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of zoonosis prevention and control. This review is intended to overview the social impact of the implementation of OH on zoonosis prevention and control. METHODS: A scoping review of studies in the past 10 years was performed to overview the integration feature of OH in zoonosis prevention and control and the social impacts of OH. PubMed and Web of Science were searched for studies published in English between January 2011 and June 2021. The included studies were selected based on predefined criteria. RESULTS: Thirty-two studies were included in this review, and most of them adopted qualitative and semi-qualitative methods. More than 50% of the studies focused on zoonosis prevention and control. Most studies were conducted in low- and middle-income countries in Africa and Asia. Applying OH approach in diseases control integrates policymakers, stakeholders, and academics from various backgrounds. The impact of OH on economic is estimated that it may alleviate the burden of diseases and poverty in the long term, even though more financial support might be needed at the initial stage of OH implementation. OH implementation considers social and ecological factors related to zoonosis transmission and provides comprehensive strategies to assess and address related risks in different communities according to regions and customs. CONCLUSIONS: Based on reviewed literature, although there seems to be a lack of guidelines for assessing and visualizing the outcomes of OH implementation, which may limit the large-scale adoption of it, evidence on the contributions of implementing OH concepts on zoonosis prevention and control indicates long-term benefits to society, including a better integration of politics, stakeholders and academics to improve their cooperation, a potential to address economic issues caused by zoonosis, and a comprehensive consideration on social determinants of health during zoonosis prevention and control.

Pandemic origins and a One Health approach to preparedness and prevention: Solutions based on SARS-CoV-2 and other RNA viruses.

COVID-19 is the latest zoonotic RNA virus epidemic of concern. Learning how it began and spread will help to determine how to reduce the risk of future events. We review major RNA virus outbreaks since 1967 to identify common features and opportunities to prevent emergence, including ancestral viral origins in birds, bats, and other mammals; animal reservoirs and intermediate hosts; and pathways for zoonotic spillover and community spread, leading to local, regional, or international outbreaks. The increasing scientific evidence concerning the origins of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) is most consistent with a zoonotic origin and a spillover pathway from wildlife to people via wildlife farming and the wildlife trade. We apply what we know about these outbreaks to identify relevant, feasible, and implementable interventions. We identify three primary targets for pandemic prevention and preparedness: first, smart surveillance coupled with epidemiological risk assessment across wildlife-livestock-human (One Health) spillover interfaces; second, research to enhance pandemic preparedness and expedite development of vaccines and therapeutics; and third, strategies to reduce underlying drivers of spillover risk and spread and reduce the influence of misinformation. For all three, continued efforts to improve and integrate biosafety and biosecurity with the implementation of a One Health approach are essential. We discuss new models to address the challenges of creating an inclusive and effective governance structure, with the necessary stable funding for cross-disciplinary collaborative research. Finally, we offer recommendations for feasible actions to close the knowledge gaps across the One Health continuum and improve preparedness and response in the future.

Zoonoses and Animal Culling: The Need for One Health Policy.

One Health (OH) as a biomedical and social movement calls to reorient public health approaches toward more holistic, nonanthropocentric approaches that do not exclude the interests of animals and ecosystems. OH thus urges reexamination, from both scientific and moral perspectives, of the practice of culling pet, farm, or wild animals in the face of a zoonosis. Pandemics such as Covid and monkeypox highlight the need for more rigorous analysis of the justifications traditionally provided to back these culling practices. Such analyses should then ground reasonable OH policies and legislation that consider the rights of humans, animals, and the environment. Bill S.861, "Advancing Emergency Preparedness through One Health Act of 2021," which was introduced in the U.S. Congress, is a step in the right direction.

The concept of one health applied to the problem of zoonotic diseases.

Zoonotic diseases are a burden on healthcare systems globally, particularly underdeveloped nations. Numerous vertebrate animals (e.g., birds, mammals and reptiles) serve as amplifier hosts or reservoirs for viral zoonoses. The spread of zoonotic disease is associated with environmental factors, climate change, animal health as well as other human activities including globalization, urbanization and travel. Diseases at the human-animal environment interface (e.g., zoonotic diseases, vector-borne diseases, food/water borne diseases) continue to pose risk to animals and humans with a great significant mortality and morbidity. It is estimated that of 1400 infectious diseases known to affect humans, 60% of them are of animal origin. In addition, 75% of the emerging infectious diseases have a zoonotic nature, worldwide. The one health concept plays an important role in the control and prevention of zoonoses by integrating animal, human, and environmental health through collaboration and communication among osteopaths, wildlife, physicians, veterinarians professionals, public health and environmental experts, nurses, dentists, physicists, biomedical engineers, plant pathologists, biochemists, and others. No one sector, organization, or person can address issues at the animal-human-ecosystem interface alone.

A treaty to break the pandemic cycle.

An evidence-based treaty must balance prevention, preparedness, response, and repair.

An argument for pandemic risk management using a multidisciplinary One Health approach to governance: an Australian case study.

The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in significant global impact. However, COVID-19 is just one of several high-impact infectious diseases that emerged from wildlife and are linked to the human relationship with nature. The rate of emergence of new zoonoses (diseases of animal origin) is increasing, driven by human-induced environmental changes that threaten biodiversity on a global scale. This increase is directly linked to environmental drivers including biodiversity loss, climate change and unsustainable resource extraction. Australia is a biodiversity hotspot and is subject to sustained and significant environmental change, increasing the risk of it being a location for pandemic origin. Moreover, the global integration of markets means that consumption trends in Australia contributes to the risk of disease spill-over in our regional neighbours in Asia-Pacific, and beyond. Despite the clear causal link between anthropogenic pressures on the environment and increasing pandemic risks, Australia's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, like most of the world, has centred largely on public health strategies, with a clear focus on reactive management. Yet, the span of expertise and evidence relevant to the governance of pandemic risk management is much wider than public health and epidemiology. It involves animal/wildlife health, biosecurity, conservation sciences, social sciences, behavioural psychology, law, policy and economic analyses to name just a few.The authors are a team of multidisciplinary practitioners and researchers who have worked together to analyse, synthesise, and harmonise the links between pandemic risk management approaches and issues in different disciplines to provide a holistic overview of current practice, and conclude the need for reform in Australia. We discuss the adoption of a comprehensive and interdisciplinary 'One Health' approach to pandemic risk management in Australia. A key goal of the One Health approach is to be proactive in countering threats of emerging infectious diseases and zoonoses through a recognition of the interdependence between human, animal, and environmental health. Developing ways to implement a One Health approach to pandemic prevention would not only reduce the risk of future pandemics emerging in or entering Australia, but also provide a model for prevention strategies around the world.

Understanding and strengthening wildlife and zoonotic disease policy processes: A research imperative.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the urgency and importance of monitoring, managing and addressing zoonotic diseases, and the acute challenges of doing so with sufficient inter-jurisdictional coordination in a dynamic global context. Although wildlife pathogens are well-studied clinically and ecologically, there is very little systematic scholarship on their management or on policy implications. The current global pandemic therefore presents a unique social science research imperative: to understand how decisions are made about preventing and responding to wildlife diseases, especially zoonoses, and how those policy processes can be improved as part of early warning systems, preparedness and rapid response. To meet these challenges, we recommend intensified research efforts towards: (i) generating functional insights about wildlife and zoonotic disease policy processes, (ii) enabling social and organizational learning to mobilize those insights, (iii) understanding epistemic instability to address populist anti-science and (iv) anticipating evolving and new zoonotic emergences, especially their human dimensions. Since policy processes for zoonoses can be acutely challenged during the early stages of an epidemic or pandemic, such insights can provide a pragmatic, empirically-based roadmap for enhancing their robustness and efficacy, and benefiting long-term decision-making efforts.

Projecting vaccine demand and impact for emerging zoonotic pathogens.

BACKGROUND: Despite large outbreaks in humans seeming improbable for a number of zoonotic pathogens, several pose a concern due to their epidemiological characteristics and evolutionary potential. To enable effective responses to these pathogens in the event that they undergo future emergence, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is advancing the development of vaccines for several pathogens prioritized by the World Health Organization. A major challenge in this pursuit is anticipating demand for a vaccine stockpile to support outbreak response. METHODS: We developed a modeling framework for outbreak response for emerging zoonoses under three reactive vaccination strategies to assess sustainable vaccine manufacturing needs, vaccine stockpile requirements, and the potential impact of the outbreak response. This framework incorporates geographically variable zoonotic spillover rates, human-to-human transmission, and the implementation of reactive vaccination campaigns in response to disease outbreaks. As proof of concept, we applied the framework to four priority pathogens: Lassa virus, Nipah virus, MERS coronavirus, and Rift Valley virus. RESULTS: Annual vaccine regimen requirements for a population-wide strategy ranged from > 670,000 (95% prediction interval 0-3,630,000) regimens for Lassa virus to 1,190,000 (95% PrI 0-8,480,000) regimens for Rift Valley fever virus, while the regimens required for ring vaccination or targeting healthcare workers (HCWs) were several orders of magnitude lower (between 1/25 and 1/700) than those required by a population-wide strategy. For each pathogen and vaccination strategy, reactive vaccination typically prevented fewer than 10% of cases, because of their presently low R0 values. Targeting HCWs had a higher per-regimen impact than population-wide vaccination. CONCLUSIONS: Our framework provides a flexible methodology for estimating vaccine stockpile needs and the geographic distribution of demand under a range of outbreak response scenarios. Uncertainties in our model estimates highlight several knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to target vulnerable populations more accurately. These include surveillance gaps that mask the true geographic distribution of each pathogen, details of key routes of spillover from animal reservoirs to humans, and the role of human-to-human transmission outside of healthcare settings. In addition, our estimates are based on the current epidemiology of each pathogen, but pathogen evolution could alter vaccine stockpile requirements.

Clinical xenotransplantation seems close: Ethical issues persist.

Scientific barriers that have prevented successful xenotransplantation are being breached, yet many ethical issues remain. Some are broad issues that accompany the adoption of novel and expensive technologies, and some are unique to xenotransplantation. Major ethical questions include areas such as: viral transmission; zoonoses and lifetime surveillance; interfering with nature; efficacy, access, and expense; treatment of animals; regulation and oversight.

Knowledge, risk perception, and prevention preparedness towards COVID-19 among a cross-section of animal health professionals in Nigeria.

Introduction: the on-going COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus has imposed serious public health and economic threats on the entire world population. The SARS-CoV-2 has been identified from both domestic and wild animals constituting a threat to humans since most apparently healthy animals may potentially infect and cause the disease in humans, especially Animal Health Professionals (AHPs) who come directly in contact with animals. These professionals such as veterinarians play important roles among the One Health team in controlling the pandemic. This survey was conducted to assess the knowledge, risk perception, and prevention behaviors of AHPs in Nigeria who are important personnel in the control of emerging and re-emerging zoonotic and infectious diseases. Methods: an online-based epidemiological cross-sectional pre-tested questionnaire survey was carried out from April to May 2020. A total of 427 AHPs joined this survey. Descriptive statistics, chi-square test, and binary logistic regression model were used to analyze the data collected. Results: the respondents have a mean knowledge score of 7.34 ± 2.05 (from a total possible score of 11) with the majority (66.7%, n = 285) having satisfactory knowledge scores on COVID-19. A high proportion (240/353) of respondents reported bats to be the major wildlife incriminated in the transmission of the COVID-19 virus though other animals reported were tiger, monkey, lion, and pangolin. At least, a quarter 131 (30.7%) of respondents perceived that visiting live animal markets is of high zoonotic risk to the spread of coronavirus. Most respondents reported hands washing and sanitizing after handling animals, and using personal protective equipment when handling suspected animals. At p<0.05; respondents' age, marital status, professional status, and geopolitical zone were significantly linked with satisfactory knowledge. Veterinarians (OR=0.40; 95%CI: 0.22-0.75) were thrice less likely to possess unsatisfactory knowledge of COVID-19 than laboratory technologists. Conclusion: participants in this survey have a satisfactory level of COVID-19 knowledge and good mitigation measures instituted while working at their stations. However, AHPs need more enlightenment about the various zoonotic risk pathway contributing to the transmission of COVID-19.